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ABSTRACT 
 
The impact of health on economic growth has been widely discussed in 
previous literature. The literature indicates that a healthier population leads 
to economic growth. This thesis studies the relationship between corruption 
and health in Sub-Saharan Africa, using a fixed effects model. The result 
indicates that corruption has an effect on two of the chosen health 
indicators: under-five mortality rate and life expectancy. This implies that 
fighting corruption leads to better health, and could be an important tool for 
an increased economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
  
   
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1 
2. Previous Literature ................................................................................................................. 2 
3. Data ........................................................................................................................................ 4 
4. Method ................................................................................................................................... 8 
5. Results .................................................................................................................................. 10 
6. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 17 
7. References ............................................................................................................................ 20 
Appendix .................................................................................................................................. 22 
I. Countries used in the regressions ...................................................................................... 22 
II. Issues with the data .......................................................................................................... 22 
III. Fixed effects ................................................................................................................... 23 
VI. Tables and graphs ........................................................................................................... 25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 1 
 
  1. INTRODUCTION   
 
This thesis aims to study the relationship between corruption and health 
outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa, using a panel data set covering 36 
countries during the period 2002-2011. The effect of corruption on different 
social and economic outcomes has been studied before, but we have yet to 
find a paper looking at and comparing the effect of corruption on different 
health indicators over several years.  
 
When new findings of natural resources cause a boom in the economy, 
democracies tend to have a stronger negative effect on long-term growth 
than autocracies do (Collier, 2008). How the assets are used is more 
important for the development of a country than how the political leaders 
gained power, and simply exploring the causal effect of democracy on a 
country’s well-being could fail to account for how a nation is managed in 
practice. Corrupt officials stealing from the health budget can cause projects 
aimed at improving general health to have a smaller impact. If bribes occur 
in the public health sector, the poor part of the population might not get 
access to affordable health service, which affects public health negatively in 
the country by making the service less effective (Savedoff & Hussmann, 
2006). Corrupted systems work to the advantage of the wealthy part of the 
population, and exploit the poor (You & Khagram, 2004). 
 
Poor health could have strong socio-economic consequences and hamper 
growth and development, though empirical results vary (further discussed in 
previous literature). It has been argued that this effect is due to health being 
an important aspect of human capital, especially for developing countries 
where manual labor is of larger importance (Bloom et al., 2004). The effect 
of HIV/AIDS on the economic growth of a country has previously been 
studied. A reduced workforce has a negative effect on the output of goods, 
though the estimated magnitude of the effect varies. Some studies have 
shown the effect to be insignificant, while the United Nations (2014) claims 
that HIV/AIDS can reduce GDP with as much as 2-4 percent.  
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There are several transmission mechanisms between corruption and 
hampered growth. Corruption leads to lower levels of private investment 
which affects the economic growth of a nation. Previous studies claim that a 
one percent increase in the level of corruption could decrease the growth 
rate of the economy with 0.7 percent (Hung Mo, 2000). It could also have a 
negative effect on human capital and contribute to political instability 
(Witvliet et al., 2013).  
 
The Millennium Development Goals, an international effort established by 
the United Nations, aim to reduce extreme poverty and hunger, fight 
diseases such as HIV/AIDS, reduce child mortality and improve maternal 
health (UN, 2014). Steady progress is being made towards the goals, but it 
is uncertain if most of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa will be able to 
reach them by 2015. The region has many health issues; Republic of the 
Congo and Nigeria alone account for 40 percent of the deaths by malaria 
worldwide. If there is a significant causality between corruption and health, 
fighting corruption might prove to be an important strategy to reach 
important goals of health aspects. This study has strong policy relevance 
since it suggests that counteracting corruption is an important means to 
achieve health related goals, both global and national.   
 
 
  2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 
Bloom et al. (2004) look at the impact of health on economic growth, by 
analyzing panel data collected from countries observed every 10 years, from 
1960 to 1990. They find the correlation between health and economic 
growth to be statistically significant and positive; an increase of life 
expectancy by one year gives a growth in output by 4 percent. Bleakly 
(2010) argues that the relationship is ambiguous, and that the assumption 
that health has a causal effect on economic growth needs to be evaluated. 
Weil (2014) argues that the correlation in many analyses is overestimated, 
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due to an identification problem of the parameters. Analyses made with 
better identification instead tend to find small (sometimes negative) and 
delayed effects of health on economic growth. Looking at previous research, 
the author finds it more plausible that economic growth has a positive effect 
on health, at least in the long run. He also states that the welfare effects of 
health are large. 
 
Minou (2014) studies the impact of conflict on child health in Côte d'Ivoire 
between the years 2002 and 2007. The result shows that children from 
regions greatly affected by conflict have worse health than children from 
more peaceful areas. The author finds evidence that the most important 
channel through which conflict affects health is economic loss. There have 
also been studies regarding economic growth and loss while studying the 
effect of the economic crisis during 2008-2009 on child mortality in Sub-
Saharan Africa. By using a regression model to estimate the impact of the 
crisis, the evidence suggests that the crisis indirectly caused the deaths of 
28,000 to 50,000 children in 2009 (Friedman & Schady 2012).  
 
Hanf et al. (2011) look at the relation between corruption and child 
mortality on a global scale during a one year period. Their findings imply 
that corruption could explain 1.6 percent of child mortality worldwide, but 
they state their concern that the model might underestimate the effect. 
Kudamatsu (2012) looks at the relation between democracy and infant 
mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the countries experienced a decrease 
in infant mortality after democratization. Democracy can be discussed in 
different terms; it can be defined as a country which has a public voting 
system where the people has the chance to vote for a politician who will 
represent them, but one can also look at levels of democracy. The level of 
democracy can be measured by (among other things) governance and the 
decision-making of the government. 
 
In a paper similar to ours, Witvliet et al. (2013) use survey data to analyze 
the effect of corruption on the general health of adults in 20 African 
countries, in relation to age, sex, and socioeconomic status. They found a 
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positive relation between poor health and corruption, in all groups.  Azfar & 
Gurgur (2008) find a reduction in effectivity of health services (such as 
reduced household satisfaction, longer waiting times at clinics, and 
vaccination delays) in the areas of the Philippines where corruption is high. 
Savedoff & Hussmann (2006) discuss several reasons why the health sector 
is vulnerable to corruption. An imbalance of information caused by a lack of 
transparency means that hospitals might have to pay more for medical 
supplies than they are worth, leading to more expensive health care. The 
difficulty in predicting where and when illness will occur makes it difficult 
to manage resources in an effective way, and a medical emergency often 
results in a lack of oversight mechanisms. Since the health system is often 
quite complex, analyzing information and detecting corruption becomes a 
difficult task. 
 
 
 
  3. DATA 
 
The data used in this paper has been collected from the databases of World 
Health Organization, the International Disaster Database, World Bank 
Group, and Gapminder. Gapminder provides secondary data from databases 
such as Human Mortality Database, World Population Prospects, and 
Human Lifetable Database. This allows for a richer dataset, but the 
collection of the data might not be consequent. Since the countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa are diverse, we have included as many of them as possible in 
our regression. Due to missing data, our model leaves us with 36 out of 49 
countries. The full list can be seen in Table A.1 in the appendix. 
 
 
The corruption indicator is taken from the Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI) which is a measurement of how corrupt the public sectors of a country 
are perceived to be. The CPI is created by Transparency International. Since 
2012, the index has numbers between 0 and 100; a higher score means less 
perceived corruption. The index shows large differences for individual 
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countries. Botswana is an example of a country in the region which exhibits 
a high CPI score of 64, which can be compared to European countries such 
as France which scores 71 and Estonia which gets a score of 68. However, 
countries such as Somalia (score 8), Sudan (11), and South Sudan (14) are 
on the bottom of the list with countries such as North Korea, Afghanistan, 
and Iraq. Before 2012, another methodology was used to calculate CPI 
values (countries were compared relative to one another), and thus pre-2012 
CPI cannot be compared with the CPI of 2012. For this reason, we chose to 
exclude later years than 2011 from our regression, leaving us with CPI 
scores from 0 to 10. Figure 3.1 displays the trend of CPI, calculated by a 
collected mean of CPI for all counties (see Appendix) and years. We see a 
small upward CPI trend since 2006, after drops in 2003 and 2005. However, 
there is no clear trend over the studied timespan.   
 
                          Figure 3.1 - Corruption Index over 10 years 
 
 
 
 
How well CPI reflects reality remains ambiguous, since the index is built on 
people’s perception and actual corruption is difficult to measure. CPI 
captures “the informed views of analysts, businesspeople and experts in 
countries around the world” (Transparency International) and the fact that it 
is based on the opinions of a rather small group of people is a basis for some 
criticism (Cobham, 2013). Furthermore, the CPI scores between the years 
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2002 and 2011 are partly based on a comparison between countries. This 
means that changes in perception of corruption over time in a country could 
be better captured by the changes in methodology made to the CPI in 2012. 
 
Drought is a climate indicator given as a dummy variable, where 1 signifies 
a reported period of drought in country i during year t. The data is taken 
from The International Disaster Database (EM-DAT). The malaria indicator 
uses population data from Gapminder and malaria data from WHO, and is 
calculated as malaria deaths per million people in country i during year t: 
 
                
            
           
 
The data of HIV prevalence is provided by Gapminder, which in turn 
collected most of it from UNAIDS. HIV prevalence is given as a percentage 
of the population between the ages of 15 and 49 living with the disease. 
Infant mortality and under-five mortality data is also collected from 
Gapminder, and signifies the probability that a child born in a specific year 
will die before reaching the age of one or five respectively, if subject to 
current age-specific mortality rates. The value is expressed as a rate per 
1000 live births. Life expectancy at birth is defined as the average number 
of years a newborn child would live if current mortality patterns were to 
stay the same. 
 
Our conflict data was gathered from the Armed Conflict Location & Event 
Data Project, which collects information from various news reports. As our 
conflict indicator, we have used number of deaths in conflicts during year t 
in country i. Conflicts include violence against civilians, riots, protests, 
battles, etc. GDP per capita is gross domestic product in USD, divided by 
midyear population (The World Bank). Total health expenditure is “the sum 
of all financing agents managing funds to purchase health goods and 
services”, given as a percentage of the gross domestic product (World 
Health Organization). The descriptive statistics of our variables can be 
found in Table 3.1. 
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              Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs     Mean        Std. Dev Min. Max. 
    
CPI 306 2.82 0.91 1.4 6.4 
Drought 360 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Malaria 323 214.12 279.87 0.76 2503.12 
HIVpre 353 5.69 6.46 0.2 26.3 
Infmort 360 72.03 21.69 29.2 137.4 
U5mort  360 115.27    38.59 41.3 227.1 
Lifeexp 360 53.57 5.19 39.66 63.83 
Conf 359 154.25 422.93 0 4171 
GDP 360 1551.03 2863.35 108 23432 
Hexp 360 6.18 2.52 1.6 16.9 
      
 
Table 3.2 shows the correlation matrix of our variables.  There is a moderate 
negative correlation between CPI and the infant- and under-five mortality 
rate. The correlation between life expectancy and CPI is positive, but 
slightly weaker than for under-five mortality- and infant mortality rate. 
There is a positive correlation between health expenditure and the mortality 
rates, possibly because lower health could act as an incentive (or make it 
necessary) to invest more in health care. This could also explain the 
negative correlation between health expenditure and life expectancy. Under-
five mortality rate also seems to be correlated with HIV prevalence, GDP 
per capita, and conflict. The high correlation between under-five mortality 
and life expectancy is not surprising, since under-five mortality and infant 
mortality affect estimated life expectancy at birth.  
 
Infant mortality rate is correlated with HIV prevalence, GDP per capita, and 
conflict. The high correlation with under-five mortality is expected, since 
infant mortality is included in the under-five mortality rate. Life expectancy 
surprisingly has a small and positive correlation with drought in our dataset, 
while its correlation with HIV prevalence, malaria, infant mortality, under-
five mortality, and conflict is negative as expected. GDP correlates 
negatively with infant mortality and under-five mortality, as well as with 
malaria and HIV prevalence rate, as expected. Note that some of the 
correlation could be an effect of time trends. 
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Table 3.2: Correlation matrix 
    
  4. METHOD 
 
We are using a cross-country panel dataset, covering 36 countries. The time 
period is 10 years, from 2002 to 2011. We cluster standard errors on country 
level, and estimate our econometric model with different measurements of 
health as the dependent variable. When we cluster on country level, we take 
into account that the error term for different years might be correlated within 
a country, while adding an assumption that there is no such correlation 
between countries (Woolridge, 2008). We will be using a fixed effects 
model for the regression. Our model is as follows: 
 
                           
          
 
 
where our health indicator is infant mortality, under-five mortality, or life 
expectancy; cpi is country i’s CPI score in year t, and X is a vector of other 
observable characteristics: drought, deaths in malaria, prevalence of HIV, 
conflict, GDP per capita, and health expenditure. a represents unobserved 
factors which vary across countries but are constant over time (fixed effects), 
while u contains all unobserved factors which vary across both countries 
and time. An assumption regarding the fixed effects model is that it works 
under strict exogeneity, the observed variables are not allowed to be 
correlated with the error term u. By using a fixed effects model, invariant 
     CPI Drought Malaria  HIVpre Infmort U5mort Lifeexp    Conf    GDP    Hexp 
CPI 1.0000          
Drought -0.0943 1.0000         
Malaria -0.1903 0.0384 1.0000        
HIVpre 0.6240 -0.0628 -0.0203 1.0000       
Infmort -0.5759 -0.0831 0.1985 -0.2772 1.0000      
U5mort -0.5567 -0.0496 0.2323 -0.2982 0.9121 1.0000     
Lifeexp 0.1336 0.1010 -0.1926 -0.3946 -0.6432 -0.6683 1.0000    
Conf -0.2395 0.0775 -0.0886 -0.1223 0.1500 0.1540 -0.0915 1.0000   
GDP 0.2539 -0.1910 -0.1509 0.3359 -0.1564 -0.2149 -0.0448 -0.1119 1.0000  
Hexp 0.0596 -0.0130 0.0129 0.0784 0.2970 0.2401 -0.2848 -0.0983 -0.1572 1.0000 
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unobserved characteristics are removed. This allows for some correlation 
between the unobserved effects and our variables, since we can control for 
the fixed effects for each country. An example of such an effect is the 
geographical features of a country. The fixed effects are included in the 
model by adding country dummy variables. This way, a different intercept a 
is created for each country, signifying the fixed effects. The model will not 
remove unobserved effects which are not constant over time, which means 
there is still a risk that the observed variables are correlated with the error 
term (Woolridge, 2008). The risk for omitted variable bias decreases, but 
does not go away entirely. Omitted variable bias is further discussed in the 
conclusion of this paper.  
 
The standard errors of the fixed effects regression may be larger compared 
to other models, which leads to larger p-values and a wider confidence 
interval. The reason is that we only estimate the within differences, and 
dispose of any information between the countries. This potentially harms 
some of the power of the analysis (Woolridge, 2008). A more detailed 
discussion of the assumptions under which the fixed effects model can be 
used, as well as our full fixed effects model, is included in the appendix.  
 
Before adding additional explanatory variables to our regression, we will 
test for CPI score only, since corruption is the variable we are most 
interested in. For infant mortality and under-five mortality, we will then add 
drought, malaria, HIV prevalence, conflict, health expenditure, and GDP per 
capita as explanatory variables. Finally, we see if we can detect a time trend 
by adding each year as a dummy variable and see how this affects the 
regression. Since the time period we analyze is relatively short, we have 
chosen to not include a time dummy in all of our regressions. 
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  5. RESULTS 
 
Graph 5.1 is using available data from 48 countries (all Sub-Saharan 
countries excluding South Sudan), and shows the relationship between 
under-five mortality rate, infant mortality rate, life expectancy and CPI. The 
graphs for under-five mortality rate and infant mortality rate show a 
negative relationship with large variance, especially in countries with low 
CPI. Countries with a CPI value of roughly 4 and over all have a child 
mortality of less than 10 percent (100 children per 1000 births). Most 
countries with a smaller CPI have a child mortality rate above 5 percent. 
Life expectancy has a positive relationship with CPI, but with a large 
variance. Note that a high value of CPI signifies a lower perceived 
corruption rate. This would imply that the relationship between corruption 
and under-five mortality as well as infant mortality is positive, while there’s 
a weak negative relationship between corruption and life expectancy. 
 
                                         Graph 5.1: Health indicators and CPI, scatterplots 
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Graph 5.2 shows the relationship between under-five mortality and CPI 
when comparing the richer and poorer countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
GDP per capita is the most straightforward measurement we have available 
in our data, but it has its drawbacks. An uneven distribution of wealth means 
that a country can have a high GDP per capita while the majority of the 
population is still poor. As an attempt to take those cases into account, we 
are also using life expectancy as an alternative measurement of wealth. The 
relationship between life expectancy and economic development is 
thoroughly discussed in literature, and can be demonstrated by the use of a 
Preston Curve (Bloom & Canning 2007).  Looking at the graphs, the 
relationship is clearer and has lower variance when inspecting the more 
wealthy countries, though the number of observations falling into this 
category is rather small.  The relationship is less clear for the countries 
below the average, especially when looking at GDP per capita, with fewer 
countries having a high CPI score. The graph for below average life 
expectancy shows a clearer relationship but with high variance. Similar 
scatterplots with infant mortality on the y-axis can be found in the appendix, 
Figure A.1. 
Graph 5.2: Under-five mortality and CPI: above and below average GDP/capita and life expectancy 
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Table 5.1 shows the result of regressions with CPI as the only explanatory 
variable. Using under-five mortality as the dependent variable shows a 
negative and statistically significant relationship, implying that an increase 
in the CPI score with one point would result in a decrease in under-five 
mortality with 10.35. The result when using infant mortality as the 
dependent variable is not statistically significant. Running the regression 
with life expectancy as a dependent variable generates a statistically 
significant result, and implies that an increase in the CPI score with one unit 
would result in life expectancy increasing with nearly one and a half year. 
 
                              Table 5.1: CPI as only explanatory variable, FE 
 u5mort infmort lifeexp 
cpi -10.350 -2.874 1.484 
 (2.58)* (1.18) (2.49)* 
_cons 207.096 117.603 46.216 
 (26.35)** (24.56)** (39.56)** 
    
Observations 
Country FE 
306 
YES 
306 
YES 
306 
YES 
    
                                                                 * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
 
Since it is very likely that other factors correlated with both corruption and 
health exist, we run the regressions again adding several explanatory 
variables. As shown in table 5.2, CPI is statistically significant on the 1 
percent level when running a regression on under-five mortality. If CPI is 
increased by 1 it causes a reduction of under-five mortality by 9.92. This 
means that an increase by one in CPI (a decrease in perceived corruption) 
reduces deaths by nearly 10 per 1000 children. HIV prevalence has a 
significant result and increases the under-five mortality by 10.87. From this 
result there is no evidence for drought, conflict, or malaria having a 
statistically significant effect on the under-five mortality rate. 
 
The result for infant mortality is also negative, though not statistically 
significant. We find no evidence for the effect of corruption on infant 
mortality. Prevalence of HIV is shown to be statistically significant at the 5 
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percent level, which tells us that if the part of the population which lives 
with HIV increases with 1 percent, infant mortality goes up with 4.8 per 
1000 children. 
CPI is significant on the 1 percent level when running a regression with life 
expectancy as the dependent variable. If the CPI score is increased by 1, life 
expectancy is increased by 1.35, more than a year. HIV prevalence also 
gives a significant result, and shows that an increase with 1 percent in the 
part of the population which lives with HIV decreases life expectancy with 
1.65 years. We find no evidence that drought, malaria, conflict, or health 
expenditures have a statistically significant effect on life expectancy. 
 
   Table 5.2: All observed variables, FE 
 u5mort infmort lifeexp 
cpi -9.920 -3.994 1.348 
 (3.53)** (1.79) (3.25)** 
drought -1.681 -0.691 -0.175 
 (0.77) (0.65) (0.78) 
malaria -0.017 -0.008 0.001 
 (1.18) (0.99) (0.37) 
hivpre 10.866 4.799 -1.646 
 (3.95)** (2.46)* (3.11)** 
conf 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.45) (0.36) (0.66) 
hexp -2.854 -0.227 0.346 
 (2.17)* (0.18) (1.59) 
gdp -0.004 -0.000 0.000 
 (2.50)* (0.31) (2.10)* 
 
Observations 
Country FE 
279 
YES 
279 
YES 
279 
YES 
 
                                                         * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
 
The standard errors of the CPI variable in all three regressions have gone up 
after adding more explanatory variables. If we run the same regressions 
without clustering (see Table A.3 in the appendix), we get larger standard 
errors. 
 14 
 
Table 5.3 shows the CPI effect on under-five mortality rate for countries 
with above and below average life expectancy. The CPI is significant on the 
1 percent level for countries with above average life expectancy, and affects 
under-five mortality with nearly -9. Compared to the regression on table 5.2 
there is a difference with about 1. The result for the countries with below 
average life expectancy shows a larger effect of -11.7, but is only significant 
on the 10 per cent level. Judging by the regressions, the wealthier countries 
seem to be less affected by corruption than the less wealthy countries. In 
fact, the standard errors for CPI in both regressions are lower than it is for 
the sample as a whole. Part of this effect could be due to reverse causality; 
there could be other factors making some countries more vulnerable to 
certain effect of corruption, in turn lowering their welfare. When using GDP 
per capita as an indicator for rich and poor countries (see the appendix, 
Table A.2), we do not get statistically significant results. 
 
 
                                     Table 5.3: Under-five mortality 
                         Above and below average life expectancy, FE 
 u5mort 
Above average 
lifeexp 
u5mort 
Below average 
lifeexp 
cpi -8.977 -11.681 
 (3.02)*** (1.84)* 
drought -3.636 0.620 
 (1.13) (0.33) 
malaria -0.028 -0.012 
 (0.99) (0.86) 
hivpre 4.338 11.895 
 (1.15) (4.06)*** 
conf 0.010 -0.000 
 (0.67) (0.05) 
hexp -2.732 -2.263 
 (1.59) (1.48) 
gdp -0.006 -0.003 
 (2.12)** (1.76) 
 
Observations 
Country FE 
156 
YES 
144 
YES 
                                          * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 5.4 shows the results of the regressions when adding a year dummy 
for each year. The coefficients show the same direction as without testing 
for a time trend. The effect of CPI on under-five mortality decreases to a 
large extent, while the effect on infant mortality decreases by approximately 
one unit. The effect of CPI on life expectancy goes down by 0.9. However, 
the CPI estimate shows no statistical significance for either of the health 
indicators when adding year dummies to the model.  
 
                              Table 5.4: Regressions with time trend, FE 
 u5mort infmort lifeexp 
cpi -1.000 -3.030 0.401 
 (0.66) (1.37) (1.36) 
drought 0.134 -0.636 -0.389 
 (0.11) (0.61) (2.67)* 
malaria -0.007 -0.007 -0.000 
 (1.31) (0.76) (0.35) 
hivpre -0.082 3.616 -0.521 
 (0.04) (1.67) (1.06) 
conf -0.003 -0.001 0.000 
 (1.95) (0.55) (0.18) 
hexp -1.083 -0.075 0.178 
 (1.64) (0.06) (1.15) 
gdp 0.002 0.000 -0.000 
 (1.61) (0.32) (0.92) 
 
Observations 
Country FE 
279 
YES 
279 
YES 
279 
YES 
                                                           * p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Table 5.5 shows the result of the same regression used in Table 5.4, but 
without clustering standard errors on country level. The results show that 
perceived corruption has a statistically significant effect on both infant 
mortality and life expectancy. However, using panel-data without clustered 
standard errors could cause bias within the standard errors (Woolridge, 
2008). Table 5.6 shows the result of a test with a dummy variable for each 
year, fixed effect and without clustered standard errors. The results show 
that under-five mortality rate and life expectancy has a statistical 
significance. As mentioned before, this regression causes bias within the 
standard errors.  
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Table 5.5: Regression with time trend, FE, declustered 
 u5mort infmort lifeexp 
cpi -1.000 -3.030 0.401 
 (0.86) (2.19)** (1.90)* 
drought 0.134 -0.636 -0.389 
 (0.13) (0.54) (2.15)** 
malaria -0.007 -0.007 -0.000 
 (1.95) (1.45) (0.70) 
hivpre -0.082 3.616 -0.521 
 (0.10) (3.84)*** (3.62)*** 
conf -0.003 -0.001 0.000 
 (1.37) (0.53) (0.16) 
hexp -1.083 -0.075 0.178 
 (2.46)* (0.14) (2.20)** 
gdp 0.002 0.000 -0.000 
 (3.89)** (0.55) (1.96) 
 
Observations 
Country FE 
279 
YES 
279 
YES 
279 
YES 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
Table 5.6: Regression with time trend, FE, CPI as only explanatory variable, 
declustered 
 u5mort infmort lifeexp 
cpi -1.957 -0.942 0.486 
 (1.76)* (0.67) (2.34)** 
_cons 213.816 118.108 45.702 
 (69.40)*** (30.54)*** (79.50)*** 
    
Observations 
Country FE 
306 
YES 
306 
YES 
306 
YES 
                                                   * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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  6. CONCLUSION 
 
The result presented in this paper is analogous to previous literature and 
suggests that there is a statistically significant relationship between the 
health indicators and perceived corruption when testing without a time trend. 
However, with a time trend the statistical significance disappears. This 
means we have to be careful when interpreting our results, since the 
variation in the health indicators could be the result of a time trend. Future 
studies should implement a longer time span to further investigate the effect 
of a time trend. The findings of the regression without time trend are 
statistically significant, and show that an increase by 1 to the CPI reduces 
the under-five mortality rate by nearly 10 per 1000 children. We could not 
find that corruption has a statistically significant effect on infant mortality, 
but the result indicates that perceived corruption has a significant effect on 
life expectancy. An increase of the CPI score by one point increases the life 
expectancy by more than one and a half years. 
 
When comparing under-five mortality rate between rich and poor countries, 
we find that countries with below average life expectancy is more 
vulnerable to corruption than countries with above average life expectancy. 
If the CPI score is increased by 1 for countries with below average life 
expectancy, the under-five mortality rate decreases with 11.9 per 1000 
children. This can be compared to countries with above average life 
expectancy, where under-five mortality decreases with 9 per 1000 children. 
These findings are consistent with previous literature stating that the poor 
are the ones who suffer most when corruption is present, since it affects 
their ability to access health services. When comparing more and less 
wealthy countries using GDP per capita as the factor defining relative 
wealth, neither group yielded a significant result. An uneven distribution of 
wealth raises the question of whether GDP per capita is a fair measurement 
for the economic well-being of a country, and makes the result more 
difficult to interpret. 
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Because of the previously discussed nature of the Corruption Perceptions 
Index, our result might underestimate or overestimate the impact of 
corruption on health. Using another corruption indicator – such as survey 
estimates of bribes, direct observations, and estimates of market interference 
– could give a different result, and should be tested in further research. 
Whether our estimated effect of corruption on health is causal or just 
correlated also needs to be tested further. The causality mechanisms by 
which corruption affects health – such as the “missing money” problem and 
the poor not being able to afford life-saving treatments – are well 
documented by literature previously cited in this thesis. There is however a 
risk that there are factors we have not taken into account which change over 
time and affect both corruption and health. Access to more data could 
improve the analysis, especially in the cases where we end up with only 
three observations for a country due to missing data. 
 
There is a possibility that corruption is correlated with variables omitted 
from our regression, which are also correlated with our health variables. 
This would cause an endogeneity problem. A poor infrastructure can affect 
the health care system negatively and cause corruption to thrive, and might 
in turn be caused by something in the residual. However, a high level of 
corruption could be an explanation to why the infrastructure and health care 
system do not evolve.  
 
Countries which are highly corrupted usually have high income inequality 
and an uneven distribution of wealth. Previous research suggests that 
income inequality and health are correlated (Rowlingson, 2011), which 
could make it relevant to add this as an explanatory variable in future 
studies. Another aspect worthy to take into account is natural resources, 
which provide an incentive for corruption. It does also, however, result in 
larger investments in healthcare (Brollo et al., 2013). Education is another 
suggestion of a factor worth controlling for in future studies. A well-
working public educational system could have a positive effect on health by 
educating health professionals, spreading a general knowledge about causes 
and prevention of diseases, etc. A lack of education could affect corruption 
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by lowering the competence of politicians (Brollo et al., 2013), and perhaps 
also affect the population’s involvement in politics negatively, though 
research on the matter has varying results (Berinsky & Lenz, 2010). 
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   APPENDIX 
 
I. COUNTRIES USED IN THE REGRESSIONS 
 
Table A.1: Countries  
 
 
II. ISSUES WITH THE DATA 
 
Life expectancy as well as CPI are estimations of the real values, which 
makes it likely that there are measurement errors within the data, causing 
the rather small estimated effect corruption seemingly has on life 
expectancy to be less trustworthy. The life expectancy variable is collected 
from Gapminder, and originally comes from several different sources. This 
Angola Liberia 
Benin Madagascar 
Botswana Malawi 
Burkina Faso Mali 
Burundi Mauritania 
Cameroon Mozambique 
Central African Republic Namibia 
Chad Niger 
Côte d’Ivoire Nigeria 
Equatorial Guinea Rwanda 
Eritrea Senegal 
Ethiopia Sierra Leone 
Gabon South Africa 
Gambia Swaziland 
Ghana Tanzania 
Guinea Togo 
Guinea-Bissau Uganda 
Kenya Zambia 
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causes the risk of errors in the data to be larger, and the values in the data set 
might result from inconsistent calculation methods. 
Aside from the problem that corruption can be difficult to detect (causing 
overestimated scores), the CPI sometimes unexpectedly shows a lower score 
(higher perceived corruption) after the fall of dictators. An explanation for 
this could be that the national press is able to identify and write about 
corruption in a new way, thus affecting the perception. The actual level of 
corruption might have decreased, but the perception of corruption has risen. 
The alternative ways to measure corruption previously mentioned in the 
conclusion could all be criticized in some way, be it through a lack of 
available data or problems with measuring the true value of corruption 
(Olken & Pande, 2012). 
 
III. FIXED EFFECTS 
 
Because of reasons discussed in the method, our econometric model is a fixed 
effects model; 
 
                                  ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
   (          ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)    (                  ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )    (                  ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
   (                ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )    (            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)    (            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)        ̅     
 
 
where      are the parameters to estimate and    is the unobserved fixed 
effect. Three additional assumptions need to be made for the fixed effects 
estimator to be unbiased: The sample must be random; each explanatory 
variable must change over time (for at least some i) and no perfect linear 
relationships can exist among the explanatory variables; the expected value 
of the error term u in all time periods and for each country is zero. Our 
sample is not randomly chosen countries, but rather all the countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa with sufficient data; we are doing a population study. None 
of our observed explanatory variables are constant over time, and no perfect 
collinearity exists between the variables. Under-five mortality and infant 
mortality are closely correlated, which is expected since infant mortality is a 
part of the under-five mortality statistic. This is not a problem, since these 
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two variables never are included in the same regression. The assumption 
that the expected value of the error term u is zero is one of the most crucial 
assumption to make, and also the most controversial. We can never know if 
this is the case, since the error term is unobserved. 
 
For the estimator to be the best linear unbiased estimator, the variance of u 
must be the same for every given country and year, and the error terms must 
be serially uncorrelated. Due to a shortage of time, we have not analyzed the 
data enough to make the assumption that no serial correlation exists. 
Another assumption we are not making is that u is normally distributed 
conditional on the observed variables and the fixed effects. Without this 
assumption, t and F statistics might not have exact distributions, which 
makes t-tests and F-tests less reliable. 
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VI. TABLES AND GRAPHS 
 
Figure A.1: CPI and infant mortality scatterplot, observations from 48 countries, divided into two groups 
depending on wealth 
 
 
 
Figure A.2: Under-five mortality: Mean over 10 years 
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Table A.2: Under-five mortality  
Above and below average GDP/capita 
 u5mort 
Above average 
GDP/capita 
u5mort 
Below average 
DGP/capita 
cpi -0.606 -2.387 
 (0.13) (0.66) 
drought 2.529 -1.068 
 (0.79) (0.49) 
malaria -0.020 -0.018 
 (0.96) (1.46) 
hivpre 3.043 8.820 
 (0.94) (2.41)* 
conf 0.006 -0.002 
 (0.31) (0.36) 
hexp -6.307 -3.162 
 (1.78) (2.88)** 
gdp -0.003 -0.047 
 (2.19) (3.23)** 
 
Observations 
Country FE 
58 
YES 
221 
YES 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Table A.3: Declustered regression table 
 u5mort infmort lifeexp 
cpi -9.920 -3.994 1.348 
 (4.24)** (3.02)** (4.61)** 
drought -1.681 -0.691 -0.175 
 (0.83) (0.60) (0.69) 
malaria -0.017 -0.008 0.001 
 (2.19)* (1.71) (0.66) 
hivpre 10.866 4.799 -1.646 
 (7.48)** (5.84)** (9.06)** 
conf 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.57) (0.37) (0.88) 
hexp -2.854 -0.227 0.346 
 (3.14)** (0.44) (3.04)** 
gdp -0.004 -0.000 0.000 
 (4.52)** (0.60) (3.84)** 
 
Observations 
Country FE 
279 
YES 
279 
YES 
279 
YES 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table A.4: Regression with time trend, FE, CPI as only explanatory variable 
 u5mort infmort lifeexp 
cpi -1.957 -0.942 0.486 
 (1.34) (0.46) (1.38) 
_cons 213.816 118.108 45.702 
 (51.96)** (21.75)** (59.14)** 
    
Observations 
Country FE 
306 
YES 
306 
YES 
306 
YES 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
 
 
